Conflict in the Amhara Region of Ethiopia: Background, Dimensions, and Prospects

The Conflict in Ethiopia’s Amhara Region: Background, Dimensions, and Prospects

Since mid-2023, the Amhara region has witnessed a notable escalation in the intensity of the armed conflict between federal government forces on one side, and the opposition nationalist “Fano” militias on the other. The region, located in northern Ethiopia, is the country’s second-largest in terms of population and area.

On August 2, 2023, Fano forces launched surprise attacks in various parts of the region. The events quickly transformed into a large-scale insurgency that continues today, in the absence of any clear horizon for a settlement. In response, the federal government declared a state of emergency in the region and launched several extensive military campaigns to combat the rebellion; however, these efforts have not yielded tangible results in curbing it or reducing its influence.

“Fano” is currently considered one of the most prominent armed opposition movements in Ethiopia. Officially known as the “Fanno Amhara Movement,” it wages an organized guerrilla war against government forces throughout the region, raising the slogan of “protecting the Amhara people” from what it describes as an “existential threat” consisting of ethnic threats and attacks targeting them inside and outside the region. The movement’s narrative relies on a discourse centered around resisting “genocide and ethnic cleansing,” a discourse that resonates widely among sectors of the Amhara elites[1], particularly within diaspora communities abroad. Official reports indicate that the movement receives external support, including from Eritrea[2], according to a letter from the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the UN Secretary-General on October 2.

During the Tigray War (2020–2022) against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Fano forces gained significant military and organizational experience after the federal government allowed them to recruit, expand, and arm, which bolstered their social and military standing within the region.

The Amhara constitute approximately 26% of the country’s population of about 120 million. They consider themselves the fundamental pillar of the Ethiopian national identity (Ethiopiawinet) and the protectors of the state’s unity. While the Amhara take pride in their historical role in preserving the Ethiopian entity and its institutions, they believe they have been the target of accusations and hostility by separatist and revolutionary forces in the country over the past five decades[3].

As the conflict continues and the gap widens between the federal government on the one hand, and the ruling party and the opposition on the other, some Fano factions have begun adopting a new discourse calling for building alliances with other nationalist groups[4] to achieve broader political goals. This shift reflects the movement’s tendency to transcend the local dimension of the region toward a more comprehensive agenda aimed at reshaping the balance of political power in the Ethiopian state as a whole.

First: Connotations of the Term “Fano” A number of sources indicate[5] that the term “Fano” has been used in Amharic-speaking regions in Ethiopia for centuries, acquiring multiple and changing meanings throughout history. According to social anthropologist Tsehaye Berhane-Selassie, “Fano” refers to a “leaderless group of fighters”—or an individual belonging to such a group—who engage in combat voluntarily and without being subject to authority or accountable to anyone.

Historically, “Fano” members fought against oppressive feudal lords, and at times were recruited by them as foot soldiers to face external threats. During the fascist Italian occupation of Ethiopia between 1935 and 1941, and after Emperor Haile Selassie fled into exile, citizen fighters, including the “Fano,” formed the nucleus of the national resistance against the Italian invaders.

In the mid-2010s, the term underwent a notable semantic shift[6], as it began to be used to refer to unarmed youth protesters in the Amhara region who followed the footsteps of the “Qerroo” movement[7] in the Oromia region, demanding political reform. In this context, the term carried peaceful and symbolic meanings, as it was adopted by demonstrating youth in both regions to express their aspirations for change and justice.

The term is also used to mean “a person who travels of their own free will,” or “a band of free fighters not subject to central command”[8], reflecting the spirit of independence and voluntarism associated with it.

At present, amid severe political polarization and a rising sense of exclusion and marginalization among large segments of the Amhara, “Fano” has become the primary political and military umbrella for this demographic, both inside the country and abroad. This came especially after the decline of the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), which previously represented the most prominent political framework for Amhara aspirations, before suffering severe divisions that weakened it in recent years.

For Fano factions, the declared goal of their armed activity is to end what they consider systematic oppression against the Amhara[9], and to reject what they describe as the “Balkanization” of Ethiopia on an ethnic and linguistic basis, in accordance with the current federal constitution that divides the country into twelve regions.

Second: Causes of the Conflict The escalating insurgency waged by Fano forces in the Amhara region is one of the most serious security threats facing Ethiopia at the current stage[10], as it reflects the depth of the structural crisis afflicting the architecture of the Ethiopian state and its federal system based on ethnic affiliations. The roots of this conflict trace back to a set of overlapping political and historical factors that erupted shortly after the end of the devastating war in the Tigray region (2020–2022), which was fought by Federal and Eritrean forces, supported by units and militias from the Amhara and Afar regions, against the forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

1. The Collapse of the Alliance with Abiy Ahmed Following Abiy Ahmed’s rise to the premiership as the first leader from the Oromo ethnic group, he received broad support from various Ethiopian components, foremost among them the Amhara, who saw in his leadership an opportunity to end decades of TPLF dominance over governance. Indeed, Amhara support for Abiy Ahmed in his early days was stronger than the support he received within his own Oromo constituency.

However, Abiy Ahmed viewed the nationalist currents within the Amhara with suspicion, just as he viewed nationalist currents in Oromia and the Tigray elites, considering them a potential threat to his political project. The founding of the “Prosperity Party” in 2019 formed the ideological pillar of this project, which sought to bypass the old coalition system represented by the “Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front” (EPRDF)—considered from the Amhara perspective as a dark era that entrenched the system of “ethnic federalism” and diminished their role in the modern Ethiopian state.

Initially, Amhara elites believed that Abiy Ahmed’s project represented an opportunity to end the system based on “ethnic federalism,” which they held responsible for fueling hatred against them and politically marginalizing them, as well as making them vulnerable to violence in multiple areas, especially in the Oromia region. However, Abiy Ahmed’s gradual shift toward consolidating his influence within the Oromo raised Amhara fears that he was abandoning the national project in favor of “Oromummaa”—i.e., Oromo nationalism—which deepened their sense of betrayal and their belief that they had once again become victims of a new regime repeating previous patterns of exclusion.

2. The War on the “Tigray People’s Liberation Front” The alliance between the federal government and the Amhara elites reached its peak with the outbreak of the war against the Tigray Liberation Front in November 2020, which Addis Ababa saw as an opportunity to topple the influence of the deep state that the Front represented in the institutions of governance and the economy. In return, the Amhara elites sought to reclaim the areas of “Western Tigray” (Humera, Welkayit, and Tsegede), which they consider their historical lands but which were annexed to the Tigray region under the 1995 constitution.

During this war, the Amhara special forces and militias, led by “Fano,” played a spearhead role in military operations alongside the federal army. The goals of the participating parties—the federal government, the Eritrean regime, and the Amhara—converged on a common objective: curtailing the influence of the Tigray Front, even though the motives of each party were different. The federal government sought to subjugate Tigray and end its political threat; the Eritrean regime wanted revenge on Tigray following its defeat in the Badme war (1998–2000); and the Amhara’s goal was to regain their historical lands lost during the Front’s era.

3. Disagreements Surrounding the Signing of the Pretoria Agreement The signing of the Pretoria Agreement on November 2, 2022, which ended the war with the Tigray Front, led to the fracturing of the alliance forged during the war. The Eritrean regime opposed the agreement because it did not achieve its declared goal of completely eliminating the Front. Meanwhile, the Amhara rejected it due to provisions relating to returning the Western Tigray areas to the authority of the Tigray region, alongside the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons to their original areas in these regions, and the withdrawal of non-Ethiopian National Defense Forces (Amhara militias) and foreign forces (Eritrean forces) from the region[11].

The Amhara viewed the agreement as a stab in the back from the federal government, considering that it repudiated their sacrifices in the war and the role they played in supporting Abiy Ahmed and his rise to power—especially after the failed coup attempt in Amhara in 2019 led by General Asaminew Tsige, and the accompanying nationalist mobilization led by the “National Movement of Amhara” (NaMA), which at the time enjoyed widespread popularity.

4. Disarmament and the Dissolution of Special Forces The federal government’s decisions announced in April 2023 regarding disarming regional special forces and integrating them into regular forces under central authority caused Amhara anger to erupt once again. The decision was seen as directly targeting the Amhara region and an attempt to strip them of their last tools of self-defense, at a time when their sense of political marginalization and existential threat was growing.

While the government justified its decision by stating that these forces had become a factor of instability in the country rather than a tool for stability and maintaining security, the Amhara saw it as an attempt to dismantle their military power and subject them to central authority by force, as had happened with Tigray in previous years.

Third: Most Prominent Factions Under the “Fano” Umbrella Divisions and disparities within Fano factions represent one of the most prominent manifestations of complexity in the security and political landscape in the Amhara region. These factions are distributed across different areas and are subject to multiple leaderships that differ in their organizational goals and military tactics, despite their general agreement on defending Amhara interests against what they consider political and security threats targeting the region.

However, the lack of unified leadership and the absence of a central organizational structure have made these factions vulnerable to fragmentation and internal conflicts, which has weakened their military and political effectiveness against the federal government or other parties in regional disputes.

Despite efforts and initiatives made over the past two years to unite the main factions under a joint command, most have not yielded tangible results. Yet, field and political developments in 2025 prompted new attempts to rebuild a comprehensive framework. In May 2025, four major groups active in the four administrative zones of the Amhara region—Gojjam Fano, Wollo Fano, Gondar Fano, and Shoa Fano—announced their unification into a single entity named the “Amhara Fano National Force”[12] (AFNF), and a central command consisting of 13 members was formed. Nevertheless, some other factions did not join this alliance, reflecting ongoing disputes over leadership and the general direction of the movement.

Below are the most prominent major factions operating—partially or wholly—under the “Fano” umbrella[13]:

1. Amhara Fano People’s Organization (AFPO) Considered one of the most prominent armed factions, it has borne its current name since May 20, 2024, under the leadership of Eskinder Nega, a well-known figure in political and media circles. In September 2019, he founded the “Balderas for True Democracy” party to defend the rights of the Amhara (and non-Oromo residents of the capital). Despite his wide influence in some Amhara circles, his relationship with other “Fano” factions is characterized by tension due to political and organizational differences. However, he is viewed as a preferred interlocutor by a number of regional and international mediators in files related to the conflict in the region.

2. Eastern Amhara Fano (Wollo) Led by a field figure known as Mere Wadajo (or Miri Wadajo), it is considered one of the most important active factions in the Wollo region, which forms a geographical buffer between the Amhara and Oromo. This group focuses on defending Amhara communities in border areas, especially in light of recurring conflicts with Oromo ethnic groups.

3. National Amhara Association in Gojjam Led by Zemene Kassie, this is one of the strongest and most organized armed formations. It is stationed in the historic Gojjam region, considered one of the oldest strongholds of “Fano.” This faction focuses on protecting the region from any internal threats or federal interventions, and possesses a level of military organization and capacity for popular mobilization compared to other factions.

4. Amhara Fano Unit in Gondar (Led by Habte Welde) This faction is considered one of the most influential armed formations in the historic Gondar region. It enjoys high combat capabilities and a wide local support network. Its activity focuses on protecting Amhara interests in the region and confronting security and ethnic threats, but it adopts a largely local agenda that differs from the broader orientations of other “Fano” factions.

5. Amhara Fano in Gondar (Led by Baye Kenaw) Active in the same area where other “Fano” factions operate, but subject to a different leadership, reflecting sharp local divisions within traditional “Fano” strongholds, especially concerning issues of leadership and field coordination.

6. Shoa Fano Command (Led by Desalegn Siashewa / Mektawa Mamo) The Shoa region is of historical and political importance in Ethiopia and was a center for conflicts among various nationalist forces. Mektawa Mamo is considered one of the most prominent military leaders in this region, representing a wing that seeks to enhance the political and military presence of “Fano” in the heart of Ethiopia, where the interests of various nationalities intersect.

Overall, these factions collectively reflect the decentralized nature of the “Fano” movement, which combines nationalism and local self-defense. However, they suffer from the absence of a unified political project and lack a central command structure capable of directing their efforts within a coherent strategic vision.

Fourth: Characteristics of the “Fano” Insurgency The “Fano” insurgency does not differ much from the rural rebel movements Ethiopia has known throughout its long history, from the imperial era to the modern state. However, the current insurgency is distinguished by a number of characteristics that give it a unique character compared to its predecessors. Most notably:

a. Absence of Central Leadership Although the “Fano” militia operates within four main factions, it has failed so far to unite its ranks under a unified organizational structure or a cohesive central command. A “Fano Unity Council”[14] was briefly formed in the city of Gondar, but the Council did not succeed in imposing its authority or coordinating between the various factions.

b. Fragmentation and Division The “Fano Amhara” umbrella includes a wide spectrum of factions and entities fighting against the federal government in four main regions. However, these factions are not subject to a unified political or military leadership. Frequent clashes occur between them, and each group tends to create sub-factions of a local or geographic nature.

c. Conflicting Goals and Agendas The motives of Fano factions differ greatly; some carry a local agenda tied to defending specific areas, while others seek to achieve national or even narrow personal and regional goals. There are also those raising broader nationalist slogans. This disparity in visions and interests hinders any efforts for unified negotiation with the federal government or for effectively coordinating military action.

d. Geographic Isolation The Amhara region is located in the far north-central part of the country and is bordered by Sudan to the west. This rugged and isolated geography weakens the insurgency’s ability to achieve strategic gains or secure effective external support. Although “Fano” factions currently control about 80% of the area of the region[15], geographic isolation makes them more vulnerable to attrition in the long term, which plays into the hands of the federal government. This isolation also restricts communication among the factions themselves and facilitates the emergence of local resistance against them, whether from within the region or supported by central authorities.

e. Popular Support “Fano” enjoys widespread support within Amhara circles, as it is viewed as the guardian of the identity and interests of the Amhara people. This historical and symbolic connection grants it a strong popular support base inside and outside the region, rendering the government’s counter-insurgency strategies of limited utility. The Amhara communities in the diaspora[16], especially in the United States and Canada, play an influential role in this context by establishing lobby groups and organizations that work to unite “Fano” ranks politically and militarily and defend its cause internationally.

f. Adopting Guerrilla Warfare Tactics In their military operations, “Fano” forces rely on guerrilla warfare tactics by attacking government army positions, laying ambushes, and cutting supply and communication lines between Ethiopian army units. Although these tactics have weakened the field presence of government forces in some areas, they have not achieved major strategic gains, as the government continues to control main cities and enjoys clear air superiority, especially through the use of drones, which has limited the rebels’ ability to expand or maneuver in open areas.

Fifth: Scenarios and Expectations

Scenario One: War of Attrition (Most likely in the foreseeable future) This scenario is the most probable at the current stage, given the rebels’ reliance on guerrilla tactics and the federal government’s continued use of drones as a primary weapon for deterrence and control. The conflict is likely to continue for a long time in this manner; while the government retains control of major cities and local governance centers and enjoys clear air superiority, Fano factions remain capable of exhausting government forces through sporadic attacks in rural areas. Although this pattern of warfare may inflict continuous human and material losses on the government, it is not expected to lead to the complete collapse of its control over the region. Comparative experiences, as in the Ethiopian case itself, show that the use of drones does not achieve a decisive victory as much as it prolongs internal conflicts and exacerbates its intensity[17], which is clearly evident in the current situation in the Amhara region.

Scenario Two: Settlement or Permanent Solution (Currently unlikely) This scenario remains unlikely in the near term, due to mutual distrust between the federal government and Fano factions, and each party’s adherence to the option of military decisiveness or weakening the other party before accepting any settlement. Furthermore, the absence of a unified vision within the Amhara camp regarding the foundations of a political solution complicates any potential negotiation track. While some Amhara elites seek to achieve specific political gains, other factions reject any settlement that does not guarantee recognition of their military or political legitimacy. In addition, some Amhara diaspora circles[18] are working to create communication channels between “Fano” and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA – Shene), in an attempt to build a political or field alliance. However, this track is still in its early stages and lacks trust and internal consistency.

Scenario Three: Full “Fano” Control of the Region This is the most ambitious scenario on the part of the rebels, who occasionally put forward the demand for federal forces to withdraw from the Amhara region as a precondition for any negotiation. “Fano” factions currently control the majority of the region’s landmass and several main roads, and some have recently begun forming a parallel local authority to manage certain rural areas. However, it is unlikely that these factions will succeed in managing the region effectively in the absence of administrative institutions and unified political organization. If the federal government were to withdraw from the region—which is unlikely—it would consequently lose control of the western border with Sudan, which could inversely open indirect lines of communication between “Fano” and Eritrea via the Tigray region or Sudanese territory. However, Khartoum is not expected to support “Fano” for fear of complicating its regional relations or getting involved in an internal Ethiopian conflict.

Scenario Four: Transformation of the Conflict into a Proxy War It is likely that the region will witness an escalation in manifestations of proxy wars, whether through regional parties or local actors supported from abroad. Multiple reports indicate that Eritrea has provided limited logistical and military support to “Fano” factions with the aim of weakening the federal government and preventing it from re-launching a war on the Eritrean border. Conversely, the Ethiopian government may resort to arming local groups or loyal militias to fight on its behalf, while providing air cover and logistical support to ensure its field superiority. In light of this, it is possible that the Amhara region will turn into an arena for indirect regional competition, increasing the fragility of internal security and significantly prolonging the conflict.

Conclusion Most observers agree that the conflict in the Amhara region constitutes one of the most dangerous challenges facing the Ethiopian state today, given its wide political, security, and economic repercussions. However, the lack of trust in Abiy Ahmed’s government on the one hand, and the fragmentation of Fano factions on the other, weakens the chances of launching any serious peace process in the foreseeable future. Although hostility toward the federal government remains a primary mobilization factor within Amhara society, the possibilities of a unified political or military movement emerging remain limited due to internal divisions and the government’s policy, which bets on fragmenting its opponents rather than confronting them directly. In light of the weak international attention to the conflict and the absence of effective regional pressures, the government is expected to continue its strategy aimed at weakening “Fano” militarily before entering into any potential settlement, which means the continuation of a state of “no peace, no war” for a long time to come.