The Joint Defense Agreement Between Sudan and Egypt: Activation Scenarios and Impact on the War

The Joint Defense Agreement Between Sudan and Egypt: Activation Scenarios and Their Impact on the War

In a first-of-its-kind development since the outbreak of the war in Sudan in April 2023, Egypt has drawn “red lines” regarding the crisis in Sudan, warning against crossing them as they “affect Egyptian national security.” Cairo also hinted at taking all measures guaranteed by the “Joint Defense Agreement” between the two countries, in what is considered its “sharpest” discourse since the war began.

The Egyptian position coincided with President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s reception of the Chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. During the meeting, El-Sisi affirmed “his country’s full support for the Sudanese people in their efforts to overcome the current critical phase,” and stressed “the constants of the Egyptian position supporting the unity, sovereignty, security, and stability of Sudan,” confirming his country’s readiness to exert every possible effort in this context.

Sudan and Egypt… The Red Lines

The red lines established by Egypt for the first time included specific warnings: preserving Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, not tampering with the capabilities of the Sudanese people, and not allowing the secession of any part of Sudanese territory. The Egyptian Presidency stated in its press release that “preserving the institutions of the Sudanese state and preventing any harm to these institutions is another red line.” It affirmed “the full right to take all necessary measures and actions guaranteed by international law,” including “activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries to ensure these red lines are not compromised or crossed.”

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan covering “training areas, border security, and confronting common threats.” The chiefs of staff of both countries (Lieutenant General Mohamed Othman Al-Hussein and Lieutenant General Ahmed Farid) renewed some of its provisions through a sub-agreement. This resulted in the Egyptian army’s participation in joint training exercises at the Merowe Air Base in Sudan. The most prominent of these was the “Eagles of the Nile” exercise (version 1 in 2020 and version 2 in 2021) conducted with the Sudanese Air Force and Special Forces (Sa’iqa), aimed at enhancing capabilities in managing joint air operations, executing offensive and defensive missions, and training on special operations, alongside other maneuvers such as “Guardians of the Nile” and “Guardian of the South.”

Major General Yehia Kedwany, a member of the “Defense and National Security Committee” in the Egyptian House of Representatives, stated that Egyptian national security is directly linked to Sudan’s territorial integrity. “With the existence of conspiracies aimed at dividing it, this requires setting (red lines) that must not be crossed, in order to preserve the capabilities of the Sudanese state and to constitute a guarantee for protecting Egyptian national security,” he said.

He clarified that “the Egyptian position regarding the preservation of Sudan’s unity and integrity is firm and strong, and Cairo is capable of executing the slogans and initiatives it announces to protect Sudanese state institutions.” He pointed out that invoking the “Joint Defense Agreement” came to emphasize that “there is joint coordination between the two countries within the framework of international legitimacy and previously signed agreements.”

Ambassador Salah Halima, a member of the “Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs,” confirmed that Egyptian-Sudanese coordination in confronting the threats of dividing the country comes within the framework of protecting Egyptian, Sudanese, and Arab national security, and preserving the cohesion of the Sudanese military institution.

Amani Al-Tawil, Director of the African Program at the “Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies,” affirmed that “Egypt has set red lines for the first time in the Sudanese file, and its recent position is the sharpest since the outbreak of the war. It aligns with the Saudi and American positions regarding the preservation of Sudan’s unity, the necessity of stopping the war, rejecting parallel entities, and preserving state institutions.” She noted that it could be said there is a Saudi-Egyptian consensus on the strong stances regarding Sudan’s unity.

Features of the Joint Defense Agreement Between Sudan and Egypt

The Joint Defense and Military Cooperation Agreement between Sudan and Egypt is a sovereign intergovernmental agreement signed in August 1976 between former Sudanese President Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiry and former Egyptian President Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat. It was based on the historical ties and common interests that bind Sudan and Egypt, a belief in a shared destiny and the importance of solidarity in the face of any external aggression, and a desire to consolidate military and defense cooperation in a manner that preserves the sovereignty and independence of both countries.

According to the text of the agreement, the two governments agreed to consider any armed attack on one party as an attack on the other. The two parties pledge to consult immediately and take all necessary measures, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and ensure the security and safety of their territories. The parties also commit to coordinating their defense and military policies and to continuous consultation on matters affecting the national security of both countries.

The agreement also stipulated that the two parties cooperate in the fields of military training, exchange of expertise and information, and the organization of joint maneuvers and exercises, in accordance with what is agreed upon between the competent authorities in the two countries. The agreement also prohibited either party from entering into alliances or military agreements with a third party that contradict the provisions of this agreement or harm the security of the other party.

Based on the agreement, a joint military committee comprising representatives of the armed forces of both countries was established, tasked with monitoring the implementation of the agreement and proposing means to enhance military cooperation. The agreement also stressed full respect for the sovereignty of each party, stating that the territory of neither may be used to harm the security of the other.

The agreement entered into force after its ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures in effect in each country. It remains valid from the date of its signing unless one party notifies the other in writing of its desire to terminate it, with the notification taking effect after a diplomatically agreed-upon period.

The joint defense agreement affirmed the two countries’ belief in a shared destiny and the importance of solidarity against any external aggression. There is a consensus that the current war in Sudan is an external aggression par excellence; therefore, the texts of the agreement can be activated. It has not been proven in any published official archive that a decree was issued to cancel it, although it has been subjected to freezing or political inactivity over the past decades.

Circumstances Behind the Resurgence of the Joint Defense Agreement

A number of events and developments have accelerated the steps to bring the Sudanese-Egyptian Joint Defense Agreement back to the forefront. Among these is the Libyan involvement in supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. The meeting between the Egyptian Minister of Defense and the Deputy Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Saddam Haftar, son of Khalifa Haftar, took place amid discussions of shifts in the Egyptian position regarding the Sudanese file. This came after the RSF militia breached the border triangle between Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, concurrent with the transfer of Emirati military equipment from Libya’s Kufra military airport to Sudan.

At that time, Egypt reinforced its forces in Oweinat, intensified its aerial sorties over the border triangle, and summoned LNA representatives for a meeting in El Alamein following a similar meeting with the Sudanese Army Commander. Egypt sought to cut off the supply route heading from Libya to the RSF militia in Sudan and halt Emirati military transport flights operating from Bossaso in the separatist Puntland region to Kufra, as well as direct Emirati military flights from the UAE to Kufra.

Egypt’s escalation of its rhetoric for the first time since the war began in Sudan—by threatening to activate the joint defense agreement to prevent the division of Sudan—appears to be linked to the shift that occurred in the Yemen file on December 30, 2025, with the Saudi decision to bomb Emirati support for the separatists in Yemen, which upended regional arrangements. In this context, Saudi Arabia sought to align Egypt with its stance.

It is also likely that the Saudi position in Yemen will extend regionally to Sudan, according to Bloomberg, which reported that Saudi Arabia rejected Gulf mediation to mend the rift with the UAE and decided to curb Emirati regional influence. Egypt likely exploited the Saudi position to relatively free itself from Emirati pressure and alter the balance of power in Sudan.

Practically, the Egyptian position translated into actions on the ground when a military convoy en route to the RSF militia was bombed in the border triangle between Sudan, Egypt, and Libya after crossing the Libyan border. The strike occurred in the Oweinat region, southwest of Egypt and southeast of Libya’s Kufra. The convoy consisted of dozens of vehicles loaded with fuel, weapons, and military equipment, and the strike resulted in the destruction of most of the vehicles.

The border triangle, also known as the “Oweinat Triangle,” is a vast and remote desert region located southeast of Kufra, Libya. It represents a strategic corridor for the movement of men, goods, and military supplies across the borders between Libya and Sudan. The area has witnessed escalating tensions since the RSF seized portions of it in mid-2025, allowing for a flow of supplies from Libya amidst mutual accusations between the Sudanese Army and the RSF, as well as among regional parties like the UAE, Turkey, Egypt, and Haftar.

Sudanese sources suggested it is highly likely that the Egyptian Air Force carried out the airstrike targeting the convoy transporting military aid, which included armored vehicles. The aerial capabilities used in the raid were likely drones or precision fighter jets, which match Egyptian capabilities. Meanwhile, some sources indicated the possibility of indirect coordination with other parties such as Turkey or Sudan itself. The raid coincided with the visit of the Deputy Commander of the LNA, Saddam Haftar, to Cairo, where he discussed military cooperation and regional threats with Egyptian military leaders.

An informed official Egyptian source stated that the strike was carried out two days prior to the visit of the eastern Libyan forces’ deputy commander, Saddam Haftar, to Cairo and his meeting with El-Sisi’s Defense Minister, General Abdel Majeed Saqr. The source clarified that Cairo had previously issued repeated warnings to Major General Khalifa Haftar over his support for the “Rapid Support” militia, at a time when Egypt declares its explicit support for the Sudanese Army and the Sovereignty Council led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

The source pointed out that this raid is not the first of its kind, as the Egyptian Air Force had previously carried out a similar attack targeting “Rapid Support” elements after they seized, with the backing of Haftar-affiliated forces, the Sudanese side of the border triangle for several days last June.

The recent strike comes in the context of a convergence of positions between Cairo and Riyadh regarding several regional files, primarily Yemen, following the failure of the UAE-backed attempt to secede southern Yemen and the flight of the Southern Transitional Council President, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, to Abu Dhabi. In this framework, the Egyptian source confirmed a Saudi-Egyptian consensus on supporting the official military institutions in both Yemen and Sudan against armed forces enjoying Emirati support, chiefly the “Rapid Support” militia.

Conclusion

The Egyptian position in Sudan remained constrained for a long time by considerations of its relationship with the UAE. However, with escalating field risks in Sudan, Cairo found itself compelled to raise the ceiling of its political discourse, going so far as to hint at activating the joint defense agreement to prevent the scenario of Sudan’s division amid the “Rapid Support” expansion toward the Kordofan region. The decisive turning point came with the Saudi shift in the Yemen file on December 30, 2025, when Saudi Arabia bombed Emirati support for the separatists.

It is likely that Egypt is seeking more clearly to sever the supply artery coming from Libya to the “Rapid Support,” following the suspension of Emirati military flights operating from Bossaso in Somalia’s Puntland to Kufra, as well as the halt of direct military flights from the UAE to Kufra. This reflects a qualitative shift in the regional environment surrounding the file.

It also appears that Saudi Arabia is proceeding to choke off Emirati expansion in the region. Riyadh did not merely reject Gulf mediations to mend the rift with Abu Dhabi but made a strategic decision to curb Emirati influence regionally. This is highly likely to extend to the Sudanese arena shortly; consequently, the region will witness a strengthening of the Sudanese army and the actual activation of the joint defense agreement, leading to a direct impact on the ground.