An Analysis of the Formation of a “Joint Force” to Secure the Borders Between Chad and Hafter’s Authority

An Analysis of the Establishment of a “Joint Force” to Secure Borders Between Chad and Haftar’s Authority

The announcement in late October regarding the establishment of a joint force between the General Command of the Libyan National Army (LNA), affiliated with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and the Chadian Army comes within a complex regional context. The conflict in Sudan is one of its primary drivers, particularly after the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized control of the border triangle with Egypt and Libya last June. The RSF further tightened its grip on the five Darfur states following the fall of Al-Fashir in late October, which served as the last stronghold of the Sudanese Army and its allied forces in the region, save for a few small pockets.

Despite the objective need for security arrangements to address the chronic vacuum in border contact zones and to confront cross-border threats facing Libya, Sudan, and Chad, the experiences of past decades have shown the inability of the region’s states—due to their structural fragility and political instability—to build stable border security mechanisms, whether within sustainable bilateral or collective frameworks.

In this context, the nature of the ongoing interactions emanating from southern Libya, along with the regional and international projects linked to the regional roles and functions performed by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s authority, raise serious questions about the feasibility of this joint force and the true objectives behind its creation at this specific timing.

First: The Declared Objectives of the Joint Force Libya faces escalating security challenges on its southern borders, particularly with Sudan and Chad, where it is surrounded by volatile geographical expanses or areas suffering from chronic security fragility, leaving these borders open to various forms of transnational threats.

According to what the two parties announced(1), the objectives of establishing the joint force were defined across three main axes: securing shared borders and limiting infiltrations; combating armed gangs, highway robbers, and cross-border smuggling networks; and confronting regional challenges, including the movements of Chadian rebels and the repercussions of the ongoing war in Sudan.

However, these justifications, despite their formal validity, do not explain the move in its entirety. Indicators suggest that the creation of the force goes beyond the direct security objective. It is closely tied to deeper regional calculations related to resetting control over the Libyan south, cementing the role of Haftar’s authority as a regional security actor, and managing threats coming from the Sahel as well as the supply lines of the war in Sudan. This is driven by an approach based on influence and security utility, rather than on building stable and sustainable border arrangements.

Second: Strategic Implications of the Move As previously mentioned, the shared borders between Libya, Sudan, and Chad are considered among the most fragile and volatile areas in the region(2). For decades, they have remained outside the effective control of the respective states, serving as a permanent source of security threats that extend beyond their immediate geography into the broader Greater Sahel space.

Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime following the outbreak of the February 11, 2011 revolution, southern Libya has turned into an open haven for rebel movements from Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Mali. It became an ungoverned central hub for cross-border smuggling networks, capitalizing on the collapse of the Libyan state, the absence of a central authority capable of controlling the territory, and the broader regional vacuum.

Within the context of the struggle for power in the country, Khalifa Haftar has focused since 2019 on extending his control over the border areas in the south and southwest, including areas containing oil fields(3). This was particularly true after his repeated failed attempts to seize Tripoli and his defeat in April 2020. Since then, the Libyan south has transformed into the primary vital sphere for his authority, backed by direct regional support and as part of a broader regional project being systematically implemented.

Confirming this, and with the retreat and defeat of the RSF militia in the capital between March and May 2023—a force Abu Dhabi had bet on to seize power in the country, leading to the battles shifting to Darfur and Kordofan instead of Khartoum and the country’s center for over two years—the southern and eastern regions of Libya emerged as one of the most critical external supply platforms for the militia, according to multiple international reports(4). These areas host multi-use military bases and airports, alongside the borders of Chad, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan.

In this context, the establishment of the joint force between Haftar’s forces and the Chadian Army can be read as a move with strategic dimensions that transcend bilateral relations, falling within the reshaping of regional balances. Its most prominent implications include:

1. Creating a security-political belt stretching from Darfur (Sudan) through southern and eastern Libya to southern Chad, enhancing the UAE’s regional influence, and transforming eastern and southern Libya into an advanced forward operating base covering the volatile Greater Sahel region.

2. Liquidating or weakening the remnants of armed Chadian movements in southern Libya, preventing their use as a permanent launchpad for threats against Mahamat Idriss Déby’s regime in N’Djamena, and keeping him within this Emirati sphere of influence.

3. Controlling the borders to dominate smuggling routes, especially given the proliferation of networks looting natural resources and illicit economies in an area suffering from the absence of the state.

4. Securing logistical and strategic depth for the RSF militia, making eastern and southern Libya a potential lifeline for a separatist entity project that the militia seeks to impose in the Darfur region.

Third: The Rise of Haftar’s Entity in Eastern Libya As previously noted, in the context of the prolonged Libyan conflict since the fall of the Gaddafi regime, and with the country divided between two competing authorities in the East and West, Khalifa Haftar’s model in eastern and southern Libya has entrenched itself as a de facto authority, despite lacking international recognition. His government now exercises sovereign state functions in Libya, supported regionally and internationally, especially in light of the failure of political tracks to reach a comprehensive settlement.

In light of this, Haftar has worked to build an exclusively family-oriented authoritarian structure by elevating his sons to leadership positions within the entity under his control, especially within the structures of the LNA, allowing him to rival the internationally recognized government in Tripoli. To bolster his local legitimacy, he opened up to tribal structures that had suffered marginalization after 2011, especially in the south, exploiting the fragility of the state and the massive security vacuum in those areas.

Within this framework, pro-Hafter formations, such as the Salafist “Subul al-Salam” battalion, have emerged to play regional security roles on the borders with Sudan and Chad under the guise of border control and anti-smuggling, but practically serving as precursors to entrenching a cross-border security role. Saddam Haftar also led regional moves toward Chad and Niger(5), in an attempt to re-present eastern Libya as a regional security actor and to solidify partnerships with neighboring countries, primarily Chad.

Based on this model, and given the weak sovereignty in the region’s states (Sudan, Chad, and Libya), Abu Dhabi has resorted to investing in the southern and eastern regions of Libya by expanding its policy of relying on local proxies in fragile areas across the region—including tribes, armed groups, and smuggling networks. The trend is toward empowering them economically by exploiting smuggled local resources rather than relying entirely on direct external support.

In this context, the step of creating a joint force with Chad comes as part of a strategy aimed at conferring regional legitimacy upon Haftar’s authorities in eastern and southern Libya by networking cross-border cooperative relations. In the long run, this serves the endeavor to undermine the legitimacy of the internationally recognized Government of National Unity in Tripoli, after the military overthrow option proved unfeasible for Haftar’s camp and his regional backers.

On the other hand, Algeria is monitoring these developments closely. The growing Emirati influence in southern Libya and the Greater Sahel generally raises increasing Algerian concerns(6). Algeria particularly fears a repeat of the model utilizing Khalifa Haftar (as a bridge for logistical support to the RSF militia in Sudan) and the potential transformation of southern Libya into a platform supporting separatist tendencies within Algeria or in the Sahel region in the future. These possibilities entail direct threats to Algeria’s interests and national security, especially amid existing tensions in its relations with the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

Fourth: Abu Dhabi and Attempts to Fill the Regional Vacuum Alongside its growing influence in southern and eastern Libya, Abu Dhabi has intensified its involvement in the Greater Sahel in recent years, capitalizing on the deep political transformations brought about by the wave of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This has been accompanied by a clear recession of French influence and a decline in the engagement of major powers, who are preoccupied with international dossiers such as the war in Ukraine and the aggression on Gaza.

In this context, and with its direct involvement in the Sudanese conflict since April 2023, Abu Dhabi concluded that decisively tipping the balance of power requires geographically and politically encircling Darfur by linking it to southern Libya, and weaving a network of relations with Sahel regimes. This confers de facto legitimacy on these entities within a broader regional project.

These moves coincided with the gradual withdrawal of traditional powers from the region, spearheaded by France, which attempted to reposition itself in Chad after being expelled from the Sahel states, before later being forced to reduce its presence there as well, deepening the security and political vacuum.

During the years following the fall of the Gaddafi regime, France was a central actor in Libya and the Sahel, focusing on counter-terrorism, irregular migration, and organized crime networks. However, the decline of this role opened the door for new regional actors, primarily Abu Dhabi.

Within this framework, the Emirati alliance with Haftar reveals an approach based on supporting de facto entities and investing in non-state actors in areas of weak sovereignty, particularly in the Libyan-Sudanese-Chadian border triangle, to turn southern Libya into a regional hub for these entities. Lacking international recognition, these parties are used as proxies to execute regional and international agendas, allowing the sponsoring powers to evade direct responsibility and assign high-risk and sensitive roles to local actors like Haftar and others in this region.

Fifth: Competition Among Foreign Powers in Eastern Libya Eastern Libya is the intersection of multi-level competition between foreign powers seeking to use the region as a launchpad to expand influence into Africa, and other rising regional powers.

Russia is primarily strengthening its presence through the Russian Corps (formerly the “Wagner Group”) to expand its operational theater in the Greater Sahel, where the frequency of coups is rising. Meanwhile, Western powers—particularly the United States, France, and Italy—are engaging in efforts to contain this expansion and regain a foothold following Paris’s declining influence in the Sahel and Chad, a vacuum Moscow is believed to have filled and fortified.

In this context, media and intelligence reports indicate that Russia enhanced its presence and cooperation with Khalifa Haftar following the decline of its influence in the Middle East after the fall of its main ally, the Assad regime in Syria. Consequently, Moscow refocused its attention on Libya as a soft arena enabling it to compensate for the loss of Syria, while simultaneously providing a platform for expansion in Africa and competing with foreign powers to exploit investable resources in the region.

In this intertwined context, Abu Dhabi has consolidated its position as a pivotal actor by building networks of local proxies and presenting itself as a pragmatic security partner capable of filling the vacuum, benefiting from the fragility of sovereignty, the Libyan division, and the declining engagement of traditional powers.

In general, data indicates that such arrangements currently supported by some external parties regarding the sovereign borders of states may not lead to enhanced stability. Rather, they may contribute to deepening the region’s fragility and further complicating the security landscape, given the intertwining conflicts, overlapping actors, and the absence of a comprehensive approach that considers the social, political, and geopolitical specificities of these sensitive border areas.

Sixth: Eastern Libya and the Conflict in Sudan Consistent reports indicate that eastern Libya has unequivocally transformed into a major corridor for Emirati logistical support to the RSF militias, including fuel and military supplies. This route has become the least costly and least risky compared to existing supply lines through other neighboring countries. This corridor contributed to decisive field movements that later impacted trajectories on several fronts, such as the Armed Forces losing the desert axis and evacuating the triangle area (between Sudan, Egypt, and Libya) due to what they called “defensive arrangements to repel aggression”(7) in which the Haftar-controlled “Subul al-Salam” battalion was involved. This was followed by the RSF rebels seizing control of the border triangle with Egypt and Libya from last June until now.

Furthermore, the backing coming from eastern Libya—including the use of drones, advanced jamming devices, and communications equipment that may not even be available to regular armies in the region’s states—played a major role in enhancing the RSF’s maneuvering and expansion capabilities. This support also played a decisive role in the fall of Al-Fashir on October 26, after prolonged battles where the RSF, backed by foreign mercenaries, had previously failed to capture the besieged city for nearly two years.

Despite repeated denials by officials of Khalifa Haftar’s authority regarding what international media reports, UN documents, and official Sudanese statements have contained about their involvement in providing a rear base to supply the RSF militia in Sudan—which contributed to fueling and prolonging the conflict—field realities and irrefutable evidence indicate that the southern and eastern regions of Libya under their control have effectively turned into an advanced military base.

In summary of the above, the repercussions of this rear base—originating from eastern Libya—are not limited to the trajectory of the Sudanese conflict alone. Its objectives extend to the Greater African Sahel space and beyond, threatening to reshape the equations of regional security and stability.

Conclusion The establishment of a joint force between Haftar’s authority and Chad, even if currently just in the ideation phase, reflects a fierce desire within a project for radical security re-engineering in a fragile space. It aims to grant gradual legitimacy to de facto authorities in eastern and southern Libya at the expense of the internationally recognized government in Tripoli, after the failure of the military decisiveness option in this context.

Furthermore, despite Chad’s immediate gains in relatively neutralizing opposition and securing effective external support, the broader regional outcomes warn—in the long term—of entrenching fragmentation, fueling cross-border conflicts, deepening international competition in the Sahel, and proliferating weapons networks, organized crime, and violent insurgencies. Even in the medium term, this path is highly likely to lead to further instability rather than achieving sustainable security, with direct extensions to the Sudanese conflict and further erosion of state sovereignty in the region, which is the most dangerous scenario.